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Angelo Fanelli∗ Dimitris Fotakis†
Abstract
In this work we introduce a new model of decision-making by agents in a social network. Agents
have innate preferences over the strategies but, because of the social interactions, the decision of the
agents are not only affected by their innate preferences but also by the decision taken by their social
neighbors. We assume that the strategies of the agents are embedded in an approximatemetric space.
Furthermore, departing from the previous literature, we assume that, due to the lack of information,
each agent locally represents the trend of the network through an aggregate value, which can be
interpreted as the output of an aggregation function. We answer some fundamental questions related
to the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
A significant volume of recent research investigates opinion formation and preference aggregation in
social networks. The goal is to obtain a deeper understanding of how social influence affects decision
making, and to which extent the tension between innate preferences and social influence could cause
instability or inefficiency. The prevalent models are opinion formation games [BKO15] and discrete
preference games [CKO18], whose principles go back to the classical works of [Deg74] and [FJ90] on
opinion formation. Though seemingly simple, both models are natural and expressible, have apparent
similarities and some crucial differences.
In a nutshell, both opinion formation and discrete preference games assume a finite population of n
agents and an underlying strategy space Z , which is the [0, 1] interval for opinion formation games and
a finite set with at least two strategies for discrete preference games (this is one of the key differences of
the two models). Each agent i has a fixed preferred strategy si ∈ Z and adopts a strategy in Z , which
represents a compromise between her preferred strategy and the strategies of her social neighbors. Both
models need to formally define (i) how to quantify preferences over strategies; and (ii) how much each
agent is influenced by her social neighbors.
For the former, both models assume a distance function d : Z × Z → R≥0 which quantifies dis-
similarity between strategies. In opinion formation, d is L22 (i.e., the square of the L2 norm, motivated
by repeated averaging in [Deg74, FJ90]), while in discrete preference games, d is any metric distance
function (motivated by applications more general than opinion formation, as explained in [CKO18]).
Both models assume that the influence exercised by agent’s j strategy on the strategy selection of
agent i is quantified by the influence weight wij ∈ [0, 1]. Previous work often distinguishes between
the symmetric case, where wij = wji, and the asymmetric case, where wij and wji may be different.
Moreover, the confidence of each agent i on her preferred strategy si is quantified by the self-confidence
αi ∈ [0, 1]. Another (less important) difference between opinion formation and discrete preference
models is that most previous work on the latter (see e.g., [CKO18, ACF+16]) usually assumes the same
self-confidence α ∈ [0, 1] for all agents i and that each wij is either 1 or 0.
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The discussion above is elegantly summarized by the cost function of agent i in a strategy profile ~z:
c¯i(~z) = αd(si, ~z(i)) + (1− α)
∑
j 6=i
wijd(~z(i), ~z(j)) .
Naturally, each agent i selects her strategy ~z(i) so as to minimize this cost.
In the last few years, there has been considerable interest in equilibrium properties (e.g., existence,
computational complexity, convergence, price of anarchy and stability) of opinion formation and discrete
preference games (and several variants and generalizations of them). The main message is that opinion
formation games are well-behaved due to their single-dimensional continuous strategy space, while
discrete preference games exhibit more complex behavior. Specifically, opinion formation games admit
a unique equilibrium which can be computed efficiently and has small price of anarchy in the symmetric
case (see e.g., [BKO15, BGM13, GS14]). In discrete preference games, an equilibrium with low price of
stability exists, but there might exist multiple equilibrium points, some with unbounded price of anarchy
[CKO18]; moreover, finding an equilibrium can be computationally hard [LBN+19], while strategies at
equilibrium may be significantly different from the agents’ preferred strategies.
Motivation. An important assumption underlying virtually all results above is that each agent is fully
aware of the strategies of her social neighbors and responds optimally to them. This assumption is crucial
for establishing uniqueness and convergence to equilibrium in opinion formation (see e.g., [GS14])
and forms the basis for the price of anarchy and stability results (see e.g., [BKO15, BGM13, BFM18,
CKO18]). However, having access to the strategies of all one’s neighbors is questionable in real life
and in modern large online social networks, just because getting to know these strategies requires a
large amount of information exchange. For (a somewhat extreme) example, imagine that one does not
crystallize her opinion on a topic before she has extensively discussed it with all her acquaintances!
Therefore, the assumption that agents form their strategies based on explicit (and complete) knowl-
edge of the strategies of all their neighbors has been criticized, especially in the context of opinion
formation games and their best response dynamics. Researchers have studied opinion formation with
restricted information regimes [UL04] and opinion dynamics where agents learn the strategy of a single
random neighbor in each round [FPS16, FKKS18]. The goal is to understand the extent to which limited
information about the strategies of one’s social neighbors affects the properties of equilibria in opinion
formation.
In this work, we take a different, and to the best of our knowledge, novel approach towards address-
ing the same research question. Instead of focusing on best response dynamics and assuming that the
strategies of a small random set of neighbors are available in each round, we assume that each agent
has access to a single representative strategy, which can be regarded as the output of an aggregation
function that condenses the strategies of her neighbors into a single one. This aggregate strategy could
be provided by the network (in case of online social networks, e.g., Facebook or Twitter could provide a
summary of the main posts of one’s friends on a specific topic) or could be estimated by a poll. To further
motivate our approach, we may think of traditional political voting, where voters have fixed innate pref-
erences over the candidates, but polls (which is a form of preference aggregation) might cause the voters
to change their vote (see also [EFHS19], where the opinion formation model involves an estimation of
the average opinion of all agents).
Preference Games with Local Aggregation: Our Model. We introduce a very general game-theoretic
model of decision-making by agents in a social network, which we refer to as preference games with
local aggregation (or simply preference games, for brevity). Similarly to opinion formation and discrete
preference games, each agent selects a strategy trying to be faithful as much as possible to her preferred
strategy (which is immune to the choices made by the other agents) and, at the same time, to blend with
the environment. But in our model, the environment is summarized by the aggregate strategy of her
social neighbors.
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The basic formal setting of preference games with local aggregation is inspired by that of discrete
preference games (but there are some crucial differences, as we explain below). As in previous work,
we consider a strategy space Z which is the same for all agents, but in preference games with local
aggregation, Z may be either discrete or continuous. Another important difference from previous work
is that we allow preferred strategies not to belong to Z . This allows the agents to have more elaborate
preferred strategies and to account for preferences that possibly cannot be fully disclosed in public. So,
we assume a strategy “universe” U and that Z ⊆ U (e.g., Z may be discrete, while U may be the convex
hull of Z). We say that the game is restricted, if the preferred strategy si ∈ U \ Z for all agents i,
unrestricted, if si ∈ Z for all agents i, and semi-restricted, otherwise.
As in discrete preference games, we assume a distance function d : U ×U → R≥0, which quantifies
dissimilarity between strategies. But, instead of an exact metric, we let d be an approximate metric so as
to also allow for other natural dissimilarity functions, such as L22. Moreover, we assume the same self-
confidence level α ∈ [0, 1] for all agents and that influence weights wij are not necessarily symmetric,
have wii = 0 and are normalized so that
∑
j wij = 1, i.e., the total influence exercised to any agent i
sums up to 1 (in [CKO18], influence weights are symmetric and not normalized).
The major new key ingredient is an aggregation function aggr which, for each agent i, maps the
strategies ~z−i = (z1, . . . , zi−1, zi+1, . . . , zn) of all agents other than i and the influence weights ~wi =
(wij)j∈N on i to an aggregated strategy aggr(~z−i, ~wi) ∈ Z that “summarizes” the strategies in ~z−i. We
usually write aggri(~z−i), instead of aggr(~z−i, ~wi), for brevity. Typical aggregation functions are the
mean (the best response function in opinion formation) and the median (the best response function in
discrete preference games). However, most of our results hold for general aggregation functions that
satisfy unanimity (i.e., if ~x−i = (x, . . . , x), then aggri(~x−i) = x) and consistency (i.e., if ~x−i and ~y−i
satisfy
∑
j 6=iwijd(~x(j), ~y(j)) = 0, then aggri(~x−i) = aggri(~y−i)). We refer to aggregation functions
that satisfy unanimity and consistency as feasible.
In preference games with local aggregation, the cost of agent i in a strategy profile ~z is:
ci(~z) = αd(si, ~z(i)) + (1− α)d(~z(i), aggri(~z−i)) . (1)
Namely, the cost of agent i is a convex combination of her innate cost d(si, ~z(i)) and her disagreement
cost d(~z(i), aggri(~z−i)). As usual, each agent i selects her strategy ~z(i) so as to minimize ci(~z). The
crucial difference from opinion formation and discrete preference models is that strategy selection of
agent i solely depends on aggri(~z−i), which is a single strategy in Z , and not on the entire strategy
vector ~z−i. An interesting direction for future research is to assume that aggri(~z−i) may belong to
U \ Z .
Contribution. The conceptual contribution of our work is the new model of preference games with
local aggregation. The model is mostly inspired by discrete preference games, but is quite general
and allows for a systematic study and a new perspective on the fundamental question of how much
limited information about the preferences of one’s social neighbors affects the equilibrium properties
in opinion formation and preference aggregation in social networks. On the technical side, we provide
a comprehensive set of general results on the existence and the structure of equilibria and on the price
of anarchy of preference games with local aggregation. Our results hold for any approximate metric
distance function d and any feasible aggregation function aggr. A general message of our results is
that low self-confidence levels (i.e., α ≤ 1/2) help with the existence of equilibria and simplify their
structure, while high self-confidence levels (i.e., α > 1/2) help with the price of anarchy. Moreover, our
price of anarchy analysis for α > 1/2 implies novel bounds on the price of anarchy of certain variants
of opinion formation and discrete preference games.
Specifically, in Section 3 we show that if α ≤ 1/2, consensus (i.e., a state where all agents adopt
the same strategy) is a pure Nash equilibrium of preference games with local aggregation (Theorem 1);
if α ≥ 1/2, we show that the state in which each agent i adopts her preferred strategy si is a pure
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Nash equilibrium, and moreover such equilibrium is unique when α > 1/2 (Theorem 2). The above
two results hold under the more stringent assumption that d is an exact metric. Existence of pure Nash
equilibrium for restricted games with α > 1/2 requires more assumptions (e.g., on the strategy space,
the aggregation function, or the distance function) and is an interesting direction for further research.
In Section 4 we consider the price of anarchy with respect to the total cost and the maximum cost of
the agents. We observe that if α = 0, the cost of every agent at equilibrium is 0 and therefore the price
of anarchy is 1. On the other hand, if α ∈ (0, 1/2], the price of anarchy of restricted and unrestricted
games can be unbounded for both objectives (Proposition 3 and Proposition 4). So, if self-confidence
level is low, the price of anarchy of preference games with local aggregation behaves similarly to that
of discrete preference games [CKO18] and of opinion formation games with binary strategies [FGV16].
Interestingly, if α > 1/2, we show that the price of anarchy is bounded from above by 1 + 1−α
α
δτ
β
, for
the total cost (Theorem 3), and by 1+ 1−α
α
τ
β
, for the maximum cost (Theorem 4). We believe that all the
three parameters δ, β and τ used in these bounds are intuitive and of interest; all of them are formally
defined in Section 2. δ is the maximum social impact
∑
j 6=iwji of an agent i. Since
∑
j 6=iwij = 1,
δ quantifies the asymmetry between the influence received and exercised by any agent in the social
network. β is the so-called maximum boundary of any agent. The boundary βi of agent i quantifies how
much closer a strategy z can be to i’s preferred strategy si compared against an equilibrium strategy of
i. We believe that β is a natural parameter and can be exploited in the proof of price of anarchy/stability
bounds for other generalizations of discrete preference games. The most interesting parameter is the
stretch τ , which directly quantifies how much we lose, in terms of equilibrium efficiency, because we
only have access to an aggregate of the strategies in one’s social neighborhood. To better demonstrate
this point, let’s assume that the aggregation function is the (weighted) median. Then, in a standard
discrete preference game, the best response of an agent i is the weighted median of i’s preferred strategy
si and i’s social neighbor strategies in ~z−i. In a preference game with local aggregation, on the other
hand, i receives the weighted median aggri(~z−i) and computes her best response as a weighted median
of si and aggri(~z−i). Communication efficient as it is, the latter may lead to more inefficient equilibria,
since a small change in ~z−i might cause a significant change in aggri(~z−i). The extent to which this can
happen is quantified by τ .
In Section 5, we provide upper bounds on τ and β (δ is always upper bounded by n − 1), which
implies that the price of anarchy of preference games with local aggregation is always bounded if α >
1/2. Interestingly, our bounds on β depend only on α, while our bounds on τ may depend on the metric
space, the influence weights and the aggregation function.
In Section 6, we introduce a specific preference game, which is motivated by k-approval voting
and generalizes opinion formation with binary strategies [FGV16]. The strategy space Z consists of all
binary strings of lengthm with k ones, preferred strategies lie in the convex hull of Z , local aggregation
is the weighted median, and the distance function is L22. Since L
2
2 is a 2-approximate metric in U (but
it is equivalent to the Hamming distance when restricted to Z), results from Section 4 carry over this
special case. The main result of this section is an upper bound on β (Theorem 6), which implies an
interesting upper bound on the price of anarchy for all α > 1/2. An intriguing direction for further
research is to determine under which assumptions k-approval voting game admits pure Nash equilibria
for α > 1/2.
Other Related Work. Discrete preference games were introduced in [CKO18], where it was shown
that they are potential games, that the price of anarchy can be unbounded and that the price of stability
is at most 2. Moreover, the properties of discrete preference games for richer metrics, such as tree
metrics, were studied. Recently, [LBN+19] proved that computing a pure Nash equilibrium of discrete
preference games is PLS-complete, even in a very restricted setting. Discrete preference games were
generalized in [ACF+16] and consistency between preferred strategies and equilibrium strategies were
considered in [ACF+17].
Our k-approval voting model bears some resemblance to opinion formation with binary preferences
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[FGV16]. They proved that the price of anarchy is unbounded for α ≤ 1/2. Our analysis complements
theirs by showing that the price of anarchy for α > 1/2 is at most δ/(2α − 1)2.
Aggregating preferences under some metric function has been received attention in algorithms (see
e.g., [ACN08]) and in social choice (see e.g., [ABE+18]). Ours is the first work where aggregation
under metric dissimilarity functions is used in modelling decision-making by agents in a social network.
2 Notation, Definitions and Preliminaries
Most of the notation and the model definition are introduced in Section 1. Next, we introduce some
additional notation and discuss some important preliminaries.
We recall that N = {1, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 2, is the set of agents, U is the strategy universe, and
Z ⊆ U , with |Z| ≥ 2, is the strategy space of the agents. S = {s1, . . . , sn} ⊆ U is the set of the
agents’ preferred strategies, and NS = {i ∈ N : si ∈ Z} is the set of agents with preferred strategy in
Z . So, NS = N denotes an unrestricted game, while NS = ∅ denotes a restricted one. We recall that
wij ∈ [0, 1] is the amount of influence agent j imposes on agent i. Unless stated otherwise, wij may be
different than wji. We always assume that wii = 0 and that
∑n
j=1wij = 1. We recall that α ∈ [0, 1] is
the confidence-level of the agents. We say that the agents are stubborn, if α ∈ (1/2, 1], and compliant,
otherwise.
We refer to any ~z ∈ Zn as a state of the game. For any state ~z and any strategy z, we let [~z−i, z]
be the new state obtained from ~z by replacing its i-component ~z(i) with z and keeping the remaining
components unchanged. If ~z = (z, . . . , z), we say that ~z is a consensus on z.
We say that d : U × U 7→ R≥0 is a ρ-approximate metric, for some ρ ≥ 1, if it satisfies (i)
d(x, x) = 0, for all x ∈ U ; (ii) symmetry, i.e., d(x, y) = d(y, x), for all x, y ∈ U ; and (iii) (approximate)
triangle inequality, i.e., d(x, y) ≤ ρ(d(x, z) + d(z, y)), for all x, y, z ∈ U . We say that d is an exact
metric (or simply metric) if ρ = 1. We say that d is uniform if it is an exact metric such that d(x, y) = 1
for all x 6= y. We assume that d is a ρ-approximate metric, for some ρ ≥ 1, unless stated otherwise.
Aggregation Functions. We consider aggregation functions that satisfy (i) unanimity, i.e., if ~x−i is a
consensus on x, then aggri(~x−i) = x; and (ii) consistency, i.e., for all ~x−i, ~y−i with
∑
j 6=iwijd(~x(j), ~y(j)) =
0, aggri(~x−i) = aggri(~y−i). We say that such aggregation functions are feasible. In this work we fo-
cus on feasible aggregation functions. When d is an exact metric on Z , notable examples of feasible
aggregation functions are the Fre´chet mean and the Fre´chet median.
Given any state ~z, the Fre´chet mean of agent i in ~z, denoted bymeani(~z−i), is any strategy in Z that
minimizes the weighted sum of its squared distances to the strategies in ~z−i. Formally,
meani(~z−i) ∈ argminy∈Z
∑
j 6=i
wijd
2
(
y, ~z(j)
)
. (2)
The Fre´chet median of agent i in ~z, denoted by medi(~z−i), is any strategy that minimizes the weighted
sum of its distances to the strategies in ~z−i :
medi(~z−i) ∈ argminy∈Z
∑
j 6=i
wijd
(
y, ~z(j)
)
. (3)
We can show that the Fre´chet mean and the Fre´chet median are indeed feasible aggregation functions.
The following proposition shows that both aggregation functions are feasible.
Proposition 1. The Fre´chet mean and the Fre´chet median are feasible aggregation rules.
Proof. We prove the statement for the Fre´chet mean. A virtually identical argument applies to the
Fre´chet median.
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Let i be any agent, and ~x and ~y be any pair of states. It is straightforward to verify unanimity, namely,
that if ~x−i is a consensus on x ∈ Z , then mean(~x−i) = x. In fact, every term of the summation would
be 0 in x.
We proceed to prove consistency. Let us assume that
∑
j 6=iwijd(~x(j), ~y(j)) = 0. If ~x(j) = ~y(j) for
all coordinates j 6= i, then ~x−i and ~y−i are identical and meani(~x−i) = meani(~y−i). So, let us assume
that for some coordinates j, ~x(j) 6= ~y(j). Since
∑
j 6=iwijd(~x(j), ~y(j)) = 0, it must be wij = 0 for
all coordinates j with ~x(j) 6= ~y(j). Equivalently, for every j with wij > 0, we have that ~x(j) = ~y(j).
Therefore, for every y ∈ Z , it holds that
∑
j∈N\{i}
wijd
2
(
y, ~x(j)
)
=
∑
j∈N\{i}
wij>0
wijd
2
(
y, ~x(j)
)
=
∑
j∈N\{i}
wij>0
wijd
2
(
y, ~y(j)
)
=
∑
j∈N\{i}
wijd
2
(
y, ~y(j)
)
,
which implies that meani(~x−i) = meani(~y−i).
Pure Nash Equilibria, Social Optima and Price of Anarchy. A pure Nash equilibrium (or equilibrium,
for brevity) is a state ~z such that for every agent i and every strategy z ∈ Z , ci(~z) ≤ ci([~z−i, z]).
E ⊆ Zn denotes the set of all pure Nash equilibria of a given preference game. A strategy z∗ ∈ Z is
a best response of agent i to a state ~z, if z∗ ∈ argminz∈Z ci([~z−i, z]). We say that a strategy x ∈ Z is
a (strictly) dominant strategy of agent i, if ci
(
[~x−i, x]
)
≤ ci
(
[~x−i, y]
)
(<, if strictly), for all states ~x−i
and strategies y ∈ Z .
We measure the efficiency of each state ~z according to a social objective. We consider two social
objectives, the social cost SUM(~z) =
∑
i∈N ci(~z) and the maximum cost MAX(~z) = maxi∈N ci(~z). A
state ~o is optimal wrt. SUM, if SUM(~o) ≤ SUM(~z), for all states ~z. We denote by OSUM ⊆ Z
n the set of
optimal states wrt. SUM, i.e., OSUM = argmin~z∈Zn SUM(~z). Similarly, a state ~o is optimal wrt. MAX,
if MAX(~o) ≤ MAX(~z), for all states ~z. We let OMAX = argmin~z∈Zn MAX(~z) be the set of all optimal
states wrt. MAX.
The price of anarchy of a game wrt. SUM is POASUM = max~e∈E
SUM(~e)
SUM(~o) , if SUM(~o) > 0 for some
state ~o ∈ OSUM. If SUM(~o) = 0, then POA
SUM = +∞, if E 6= OSUM, and POA
SUM = 1, if E = OSUM.
The definition of POAMAX is similar.
Equivalence and Relative Distance between States. For every pair of states ~x, ~y, D(~x, ~y) = {j ∈
N : ~x(j) 6= ~y(j)} is the set of agents with different strategies in ~x and ~y. If D(~x, ~y) = ∅, we say that
~x and ~y are globally equivalent. For every agent i and all pairs of states ~x, ~y, we define the relative
distance of ~x and ~y for i as πi(~x, ~y) =
∑
j 6=iwijd
(
~x(j), ~y(j)
)
. If πi(~x, ~y) = 0, ~x and ~y are equivalent
for i. We observe that D(~x, ~y) = ∅ implies πi(~x, ~y) = 0 (while converse may not be true). Moreover,
πi
(
[~x−i, x], [~x−i, y]
)
= 0, for all strategies x and y.
Social Impact, Stretch and Boundary. The social impact of agent i is δi =
∑
j∈N wji and quantifies
the intensity by which i influences the environment. The global social impact is δ = maxj∈N δj .
We observe that δ ∈ [1, n − 1] and
∑
i∈N δi = n. We refer to the case where influence weights are
symmetric, i.e., wij = wji for all i and j, and δ = 1 as the fully symmetric case.
The stretch τi of agent i quantifies how sensitive the aggregation function is wrt. changes in the state
of the game. Formally, we let
τˆi = inf
~e∈E
~y∈Zn
πi(~e,~y)>0
{
r ≥ 0
∣∣∣ d(aggri(~e−i), aggri(~y−i))
πi(~e, ~y)
≤ r
}
.
We define τi = max{τˆi, 1}, so as to account for the case where πi(~e, ~y) = 0 and d(aggri(~e−i), aggri(~y−i)) =
0 (recall the definition of feasible aggregation functions). Therefore, existence of r is always guaranteed
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and τi is well defined. Since τi is used in the price of anarchy bounds, we can restrict its definition to
optimal states ~o, instead of arbitrary states ~y. We use this more restricted definition in the proofs of
propositions 7 and 8, in Section 5.
The (global) stretch is τ = maxj∈N τj . At the conceptual level, the stretch quantifies how much the
price of anarchy increases because agents only have access to an aggregate of the strategies in ~z, instead
of ~z itself.
The boundary of agent i, denoted by βi quantifies how much closer a strategy x can be to si com-
pared against an equilibrium strategy ~e(i) of i. Formally,
βi = min
~e∈E,x 6=~e(i)
d(x, si)
d(x,~e(i))
. (4)
For nontrivial games, there always exists a strategy x with d(x,~e(i)) > 0. Thus, βi is well defined. The
(global) boundary is β = minj∈N βj .
3 Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria
We first characterize the best responses of compliant and stubborn agents. The proof of Lemma 2 is
analogous to that of Lemma 1. We remark that the results in this section hold only under the assumption
that d is an exact metric.
Lemma 1. If α ≤ 1/2 (resp. α < 1/2), aggri(~x−i) is a (resp. the unique) best response of agent i to
~x−i, for every state ~x.
Proof. Let us assume α ≤ 1/2. Let i be any agent and ~x be any state. Let x be any strategy in
Z \ {aggri(~x−i)} (recall that |Z| ≥ 2). Since aggri(~x−i) ∈ Z , we have
ci
(
[~x−i, aggri(~x−i)]
)
= αd
(
aggri(~x−i), si
)
+ (1− α)d
(
aggri(~x−i), aggri(~x−i)
)
= αd
(
aggri(~x−i), si
)
≤ αd
(
x, si
)
+ αd
(
x, aggri(~x−i)
)
(5)
≤ αd
(
x, si
)
+ (1− α)d
(
x, aggri(~x−i)
)
(6)
= ci
(
[~x−i, x]
)
,
where (5) follows from the triangle inequality and (6) from α ≤ 1/2, which implies that α ≤ (1 − α).
If α < 1/2, (6) is strict. Hence, aggri(~x−i) is the unique best response of i.
Lemma 2. If α ≥ 1/2 (resp. α > 1/2), si is a (resp. the unique) dominant strategy of any agent
i ∈ NS .
Proof. Let us assume α ≥ 1/2. Let i be any agent in NS and ~x be any state with ~x(i) 6= si (recall that
|Z| ≥ 2). Since si ∈ Z , we have
ci
(
[~x−i, si]
)
= αd
(
si, si
)
+ (1− α)d
(
si, aggri(~x−i)
)
= (1− α)d
(
si, aggri(~x−i)
)
≤ (1− α)d
(
xi, si
)
+ (1− α)d
(
xi, aggri(~x−i)
)
(7)
≤ αd
(
xi, si
)
+ (1− α)d
(
xi, aggri(~x−i)
)
(8)
= ci(~x),
where (7) follows from the triangle inequality and (8) follows from α ≥ 1/2, which implies that (1 −
α) ≤ α. If α > 1/2, then (8) is strict. Therefore, si is a strictly dominant strategy of agent i.
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Theorems 1 and 2 are consequences of lemmas 1 and 2. Characterizing existence of pure Nash
equilibria when α ≥ 1/2 and the game is (semi-)restricted (NS 6= N ) is an interesting direction for
further research.
Theorem 1. If α ≤ 1/2, any consensus ~e ∈ Zn is an equilibrium.
Theorem 2. If α ≥ 1/2 (resp. α > 1/2) and the game is unrestricted (NS = N ) then ~e ∈ Z
n is an
equilibrium if (resp. and only if) ~e(i) = si for all agents i ∈ N .
4 Price of Anarchy
Compliant Agents. We first consider the case of compliant agents, where α ≤ 1/2. If α = 0, the price
of anarchy is 1. On the other hand, for α ∈ (0, 1/2], the price of anarchy is either unbounded or +∞.
Proposition 2. If α = 0, POASUM = POAMAX = 1.
Proof. Let us assume α = 0. The cost incurred by any agent i in any state ~x is d
(
~x(i), aggri(~x−i)
)
.
By Lemma 1, the cost incurred by any agent at any equilibrium is 0, from which the claim immediately
follows.
Proposition 3. For α ∈ (0, 1/2], if the game is restricted (NS = ∅), there exist instances for which both
POASUM and POAMAX are unbounded.
Proof. Let us assume α ∈ (0, 1/2]. Let us consider the set of instances with U = {a, b, s}, Z = {a, b}
and S = {s}, (i.e., si = s, for every i ∈ N ), where a, b, s are three distinct elements. Notice that
NS = ∅. Since a, b, s are three distinct elements, the distance between every two elements of U is
non-negative. Let the distance between b and s be an arbitrarily small positive number, i.e., d(b, s) =
ǫ > 0. By Theorem 1, the state ~e in which every agent choses a is a pure Nash equilibrium. Therefore,
SUM(~e) = nαd(a, s) and MAX(~e) = αd(a, s). On the other hand, the cost of every agent i in state ~x, in
which every agent choses b, is ci(~x) = αd(b, s)+(1−α)d
(
b, aggri(~x−i)
)
= αd(b, s)+(1−α)d
(
b, b
)
=
αd(b, s), where the second equality follows the fact that aggri(~x−i) = b and the third from the fact that
d(b, b) = 0. Hence SUM(~o) ≤ SUM(~x) = nαd(b, s) = nαǫ > 0 and MAX(~o) ≤ MAX(~x) =
αd(b, s) = αǫ > 0. We can conclude that for this instance POASUM = POAMAX ≤ d(a,s)
ǫ
. Since ǫ is an
arbitrarily small positive number, the claim follows.
By slightly modifying the proof of Proposition 3 and by letting b and s coincide, i.e., d(b, s) = 0,
we obtain a set of instances for the unrestricted game in which SUM(~x) = MAX(~x) = 0, from which
the following proposition immediately follows.
Proposition 4. For α ∈ (0, 1/2], if the game is unrestricted (NS = N ), there exist instances with
POASUM = POAMAX = +∞.
Stubborn Agents. We proceed to the case of stubborn agents, where α > 1/2. In Theorem 3 and
Theorem 4, we show general bounds on the price of anarchy that depend on δ, τ , β and α. The proof
of Lemma 3 follows from the equilibrium condition, the triangle inequality and the definition of stretch.
Lemma 4 follows from Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. For every agent i, equilibrium ~e and state ~z, ci(~e) ≤ ci(~z) + τi(1− α)πi(~z,~e) .
8
Proof. Using that ~e is an equilibrium state, we have
ci(~e) ≤ αd
(
~z(i), si
)
+ (1− α)d
(
~z(i), aggri(~e−i)
)
≤ αd
(
~z(i), si
)
+ (1− α)d
(
~z(i), aggri(~z−i)
)
+ (1− α)d
(
aggri(~z−i), aggri(~e−i)
)
= ci(~z) + (1− α)d
(
aggri(~z−i), aggri(~e−i)
)
≤ ci(~z) + τi(1− α)πi(~z,~e) ,
where the first inequality follows from the equilibrium condition, the second from the triangle inequality,
and the last from the definition of stretch. Notably, the proof only requires that the restriction of d to Z
satisfies the triangle inequality.
Lemma 4. If α > 1/2, every equilibrium ~e and optimal state ~o ∈ OSUM with D(~o,~e) 6= ∅, we have
D(~o,~e) ⊆ D(~o,~s), where ~s = (si, s2, . . . , sn).
Proof. Let us assume α > 1/2. Let i be any agent in D(~o,~e). We prove the claim by showing that i
belongs also to D(~o,~s). If i ∈ NS then, by Theorem 2, ~e(i) = si. Since ~o(i) 6= ~e(i), this implies that
~o(i) 6= si, i.e., i ∈ D(~o,~s). If i ∈ N \NS then si does not belongs to Z . Since ~o(i) belongs to Z , this
trivially implies that ~o(i) 6= si, i.e., i ∈ D(~o,~s).
Theorem 3. If α > 1/2, POASUM ≤ 1 + (1−α)
α
δτ
β
.
Proof. If E ⊆ OSUM, then POA
SUM = 1. Otherwise, let ~e be any equilibrium and ~o ∈ OSUM be any
optimal state withD(~o,~e) 6= ∅. We have
SUM(~e) ≤
∑
i∈N
ci(~o) +
∑
i∈N
τi(1− α)πi(~o,~e) (9)
≤
∑
i∈N
ci(~o) + τ(1− α)
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i}
wijd
(
~o(j), ~e(j)
)
(10)
= SUM(~o) + τ(1− α)
∑
j∈D(~o,~e)
δjd
(
~o(j), ~e(j)
)
, (11)
where (9) follows from Lemma 3, (10) from the definition of τ and πi, and (11) from the definitions of
SUM, D(~o,~e) and the social impact of j.
On the other hand,
SUM(~o) ≥ α
∑
i∈N
d
(
~o(i), si
)
= α
∑
i∈D(~o,~s)
d(~o(i), si)
≥ α
∑
i∈D(~o,~e)
d
(
~o(i), si
)
(12)
≥ α
∑
i∈D(~o,~e)
βid
(
~o(i), ~e(i)
)
, (13)
where (12) follows from Lemma 4 and (13) from the definition of boundary (4). Notice that the last
expression is strictly larger than 0 because α > 1/2, βi > 0 and d
(
~o(i), ~e(i)
)
> 0 for every i ∈
D(~o,~e) 6= ∅.
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Therefore, we can conclude that
POASUM ≤
SUM(~o) + τ(1− α)
∑
j∈D(~o,~e)
δjd
(
~o(j), ~e(j)
)
SUM(~o)
(14)
≤ 1 +
τ(1 − α)
∑
j∈D(~o,~e)
δjd
(
~o(j), ~e(j)
)
α
∑
i∈D(~o,~e)
βid
(
~o(i), ~e(i)
) (15)
≤ 1 +
(1 − α)
α
δτ
β
, (16)
where (14) follows from (11), (15) from (13) and (16) from the definitions of δ and β.
Theorem 4. If α > 1/2, POAMAX ≤ 1 + (1−α)
α
τ
β
.
Proof. If E ⊆ OMAX, then trivially POA
MAX = 1.
Otherwise, let ~e ∈ E and ~o ∈ OMAX be two states such that D(~o,~e) 6= ∅. We recall that α > 1/2.
Let i be one of the agents with maximum cost at equilibrium, i.e., ci(~e) = MAX(~e). We have
MAX(~e) ≤ ci(~o) + τi(1− α)πi(~o,~e) (17)
≤ MAX(~o) + τ(1− α)
∑
j∈N\{i}
wijd
(
~o(j), ~e(j)
)
, (18)
where (17) follows from Lemma 3 and (18) from the definition of τ and πi. Notice that, if none of the
agents inN \{i} is inD(~o,~e), then every term in the summation in (18) is 0 and the inequality becomes
MAX(~e) ≤ MAX(~o), which implies POAMAX = 1. Therefore, let us assume that {N \{i}}∩D(~o,~e) 6=
∅. In particular, let j∗ be any agent in such set maximizing the distance between the strategy at the
optimum and the one at the equilibrium, i.e., j∗ ∈ argmaxj∈D(~o,~e)
j 6=i
d
(
~o(j), ~e(j)
)
. Then we can write
MAX(~e) ≤ MAX(~o) + τ(1− α)
∑
j∈N\{i}
wijd
(
~o(j∗), ~e(j∗)
)
(19)
= MAX(~o) + τ(1− α)d
(
~o(j∗), ~e(j∗)
)
, (20)
where (19) follows from (18) and the definition of j∗ and (20) from the fact that
∑
j∈N wij = 1.
On the other side,
MAX(~o) ≥ cj∗(~o) ≥ αd
(
~o(j∗), sj∗
)
≥ αβi · d
(
~o(j∗), ~e(j∗)
)
,
(21)
where the last inequality follows from the definition of boundary (4). Notice that the last expression is
strictly larger than 0 because α > 1/2, βi > 0 and d
(
~o(j∗), ~e(j∗)
)
> 0.
Therefore, we can conclude that
POAMAX ≤
MAX(~o) + τ(1− α)d
(
~o(j∗), ~e(j∗)
)
MAX(~o)
(22)
≤ 1 +
τ(1− α)d
(
~o(j∗), ~e(j∗)
)
αβi · d
(
~o(j∗), ~e(j∗)
)
≤ 1 +
(1− α)
α
τ
β
, (23)
where (22) follows from (20), and (23) from (21) and the definition of β.
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The proof of Theorem 4 is similar to that of Theorem 3. We note that our price of anarchy analysis
is general and the bounds of theorems 3 and 4 directly apply to discrete preference games that satisfy
our assumptions on the influence weights wij . In this case, τ = 1, because discrete preference games
do not use preference aggregation. Assuming that α ∈ (1/2, 1] and
∑
j wij = 1 (but note that the latter
does not hold in [CKO18]), POASUM ≤ δ(2α − 1)−1 and POAMAX ≤ (2α − 1)−1 (where we use also
that β ≥ 2α−12α , Theorem 5). Moreover, in fully symmetric discrete preference games, where wij = wji
and δ = 1, we get that POASUM ≤ (2α− 1)−1, for all α ∈ (1/2, 1].
5 Bounds on Boundary and Stretch
Next, we show bounds on the boundary and the stretch under general assumptions on the structure of
the game.
Theorem 5. If α > 1/2 and d is an exact metric then β ≥ 2α−12α .
Proof. For any equilibrium ~e ∈ E, any agent i, and any strategy x 6= ~e(i) (recall that |Z| ≥ 2), we apply
the equilibrium condition and obtain that
αd
(
~e(i), si
)
+ (1− α)d
(
~e(i), aggri(~e−i)
)
≤ αd(x, si) + (1− α)d
(
x, aggri(~e−i)
)
. (24)
Therefore,
d(x, si) ≥ d
(
~e(i), si
)
−
(1− α)
α
[
d
(
x, aggri(~e−i)
)
− d
(
~e(i), aggri(~e−i)
)]
≥ d
(
~e(i), si
)
−
(1− α)
α
d
(
x,~e(i)
)
≥
[
d
(
x,~e(i)
)
− d(x, si)
]
−
(1− α)
α
d
(
x,~e(i)
)
≥
(
2α− 1
α
)
d
(
x,~e(i)
)
− d(x, si),
where the first inequality follows from (24) and the remaining inequalities from the triangle inequality.
The theorem follows by adding d(x, si) to each side of the previous inequality and dividing by 2.
Proposition 5. For α > 1/2, if either the game is unrestricted (NS = N ) or d is uniform then β = 1.
Proof. Let us first assumeNS = N . Let us consider any equilibrium ~e ∈ E, any agent i and any strategy
x 6= ~e(i) (recall that |Z| ≥ 2). In order to prove the claim, we need to show that d(x, si) = d
(
x,~e(i)
)
.
If α > 1/2, by Theorem 2, we get ~e(i) = si, which trivially implies d(x, si) = d
(
x,~e(i)
)
.
Now, let us assume that d is uniform. Let us consider any equilibrium ~e ∈ E, any agent i and any
strategy x 6= ~e(i) (recall that |Z| ≥ 2). In order to prove the claim, we need to show that d(x, si) =
d
(
x,~e(i)
)
. Notice that, since x 6= ~e(i), we have d
(
x,~e(i)
)
= 1. Therefore, in order for the claim to
hold, it must be that d(x, si) = 1. By contradiction, let us assume that d(x, si) = 0, or equivalently
x = si. This implies that i belongs to NS . If α > 1/2, by Theorem 2, we get si = ~e(i), and by
transitivity x = ~e(i), i.e., d
(
x,~e(i)
)
= 0, contradicting the hypothesis.
Proposition 6. The global stretch τ ≤ d
max(Z)
wmindmin(Z)
, where dmax(Z) = maxx,y∈Z d(x, y) is the di-
ameter of Z , dmin(Z) = minx 6=y:d(x,y)>0 d(x, y) is the minimum positive distance in Z , and w
min =
mini 6=j:wij>0wij is the minimum positive influence weight.
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Proof. In the definition of τi, we have τi = 1, if πi(~e, ~y) = d(aggri(~e−i), aggri(~y−i)) = 0. Hence, we
assume that πi(~e, ~y) > 0.
We let wmin(i) = minj 6=i:wij>0 wij . Then, πi(~e, ~y) =
∑
j 6=iwijd(~e(j), ~y(j)) ≥ w
min(i) dmin(Z),
because ~e(j), ~y(j) ∈ Z , there is at least one positive term in the sum, and if either wij = 0 or
d(~e(j), ~y(j)) = 0, the corresponding term is 0. Moreover, d(aggri(~e−i), aggri(~y−i)) ≤ d
max(Z),
because aggri(~e−i), aggri(~y−i) ∈ Z . Therefore,
τi ≤
dmax(Z)
wmin(i) dmin(Z)
.
Using that the global stretch τ = maxi∈N τi and that w
min = mini∈N w
min(i), we conclude the proof
of the proposition.
Unless we impose additional structure, the upper bound of Proposition 6 is essentially the best
possible, because there are examples where a small change in a single coordinate of a state moves the
aggregate to a diametrically different strategy. E.g., consider Z = {0, 1}, ~e−i = (0, 1, 1), ~y−i =
(0, 0, 1), wi1 = wi3 =
1−ε
2 and wi2 = ε, and the Fre´chet median as aggregation function. Clearly,
aggri(~e−i) = 1, while aggri(~y−i) = 0.
For the following propositions, we restrict the definition of τ to optimal states ~o (either ~o ∈ OSUM or
~o ∈ OMAX), instead of arbitrary states ~y.
Proposition 7. If every social optimum (with respect to any social objective) is a consensus, d is an
exact metric on Z and the aggregation function is the Fre´chet median then τ ≤ 2.
Proof. Let us consider any equilibrium ~e ∈ E, any social optimum ~o (either ~o ∈ OSUM or ~o ∈ OMAX)
and any agent i.
By the definition of the Fre´chet mean,
∑
j∈N\{i}
wijd
(
aggri(~e−i), ~e(j)
)
≤
∑
j∈N\{i}
wijd
(
aggri(~o−i), ~e(j)
)
. (25)
Hence, we have that
d
(
aggri(~o−i), aggri(~e−i)
)
=
∑
j∈N\{i}
wijd
(
aggri(~o−i), aggri(~e−i)
)
(26)
≤
∑
j∈N\{i}
[
wijd
(
aggri(~o−i), ~e(j)
)
+ wijd
(
~e(j), aggri(~e−i)
)]
(27)
=
∑
j∈N\{i}
wijd
(
aggri(~o−i), ~e(j)
)
+
∑
j∈N\{i}
wijd
(
aggri(~e−i), ~e(j)
)
≤ 2
∑
j∈N\{i}
wijd
(
aggri(~o−i), ~e(j)
)
(28)
= 2
∑
j∈N\{i}
wijd
(
~o(j), ~e(j)
)
= 2 · πi(~o,~e), (29)
where (26) follows from
∑
j∈N\{i}wij = 1, (27) from the triangle inequality, (28) from (25) and (29)
from the fact that ~o is a consensus.
The proof of Proposition 8 is symmetric to that of Proposition 7 and follows if we simply exchange
the roles of ~e and ~o in the argument of the proof.
Proposition 8. If every equilibrium is a consensus, d is an exact metric on Z and the aggregation
function is the Fre´chet median then τ ≤ 2.
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6 k-Approval Voting Game
Next, we introduce a natural preference game with local aggregation, motivated by k-approval voting
withm > k candidates. The strategy space Z consists of all binary strings of lengthm with k ones. For-
mally, Z = {~u ∈ {0, 1}m |
∑m
ℓ=1 ~u(ℓ) = k}. The strategy universe U = {~u ∈ [0, 1]
m |
∑m
ℓ=1 ~u(ℓ) =
k}. An agent i can choose any si ∈ U as her preferred strategy. The distance function is L
2
2, which is a
2-approximate metric. Namely, for every ~u,~v ∈ U ,
d(~u,~v) =
m∑
ℓ=1
(~u(ℓ)− ~v(ℓ))2 .
Note that L22 is identical to the Hamming distance (which is a metric distance) when restricted to Z . The
aggregation function is the Fre´chet median in Z .
Our approval voting model does not admit a potential function (due to the asymmetry of wij , even
for m = 2 and k = 1). Using [FGV16, Observation 2.2], we can show that our approval voting game
admits a pure Nash equilibrium for m = 2, k = 1 and α ∈ [0, 1]. An interesting open problem is to
characterize the values of k (potentially as a function ofm) for which the k-approval voting game admits
pure Nash equilibria.
The following theorem, derives a nontrivial lower bound on β for the k-approval voting game.
Theorem 6. For every integers k < m, if α > 1/2 then β ≥
(
2α−1
2α
)2
for the k-approval voting game.
Proof. To obtain a lower bound on βi, we fix an equilibrium ~e ∈ E and a strategy x ∈ Z with ~e(i) 6=
x, and find s∗i = argminsi∈U d(x, si)/d(x, ei). Then, we conclude that βi ≥ d(x, s
∗
i )/d(x,~e(i)).
Throughout the proof, we let [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. Moreover, we let x(j), si(j) and ~e(i)(j) denote the
j-th coordinate (bit) of strategies x, si and ~e(i).
To this end, for any fixed strategy x ∈ Z , let C0 = {j ∈ [m] : x(j) = 0} and let C1 = {j ∈
[m] : x(j) = 1} be indices j for which x(j) is 0, for C0, and 1, for C1. We recall that |C1| = k and
|C0| = m− k. Moreover, for the equilibrium strategy ~e(i) ∈ Z , we let C01 = {j ∈ C0 : ~e(i)(j) = 1}
and C10 = {j ∈ C1 : ~e(i)(j) = 0} be indices j where x(j) 6= ~e(i)(j). Since both x and ~e(i) include
exactly k ones and m − k zeros, |C01| = |C10|. In the following, we denote |C01| = |C10| = ℓ, for
simplicity, for some 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k. Using this notation, we can write that d(x,~e(i)) = 2ℓ.
Our goal is to find minsi∈U d(x, si)/(2ℓ), for any fixed ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, under the constraints that
si ∈ U , x ∈ Z , and ~e(i) ∈ Z is an equilibrium strategy. We first observe that
d(x, si)
2ℓ
=
1
2ℓ

∑
j∈C0
si(j)
2 +
∑
j∈C1
(1− si(j))
2

 , (30)
where ∑
j∈C0∪C1
si(j) = k and si ∈ [0, 1]
m. (31)
Since ~e is an equilibrium, and following the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 5, we obtain
that
d(~e(i), si)− d(x, si)
≤ (1− α)
(
d
(
x, aggri(~e−i)
)
− d
(
~e(i), aggri(~e−i)
))
/α
≤ (1− α)d(x,~e(i))/α = 2ℓ(1− α)/α , (32)
where the first inequality follows from (24), in the proof of Theorem 5, and the second inequality follows
from the triangle inequality, the fact that x,~e(i), aggri(~e−i) ∈ Z , and the observation that the triangle
inequality holds for d on Z , since L22 is identical to the Hamming distance on Z .
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Since for any j 6∈ C10 ∪ C01, x(j) = ~e(i)(j), we have that
d(~e(i), si)− d(x, si)
=
∑
j∈C10
(
si(j)
2 − (1− si(j))
2
)
+
∑
j∈C01
(
(1− si(j))
2 − si(j)
2
)
= 2
∑
j∈C10
si(j) − 2
∑
j∈C01
si(j) ,
where for the last equality, we use the fact that |C10| = |C10|. Using (32), we conclude that for any
equilibrium strategy ~e(i) ∈ Z and any strategy x ∈ Z with d(x,~e(i)) = 2ℓ, si satisfies
∑
j∈C10
si(j) −
∑
j∈C01
si(j) ≤ ℓ(1− α)/α. (33)
Therefore, we can find minsi∈S d(x, si)/(2ℓ) by computing an si that minimizes (30), subject
to (31) and (33). Since (30) is a strictly convex function of si(1), . . . , si(m) and the constraints of
(31) and (33) are linear on si(1), . . . , si(m), we have to solve a strictly convex minimization problem
with linear constraints.
We observe that
s∗i (j) =


2α− 1
2α
if j ∈ C01
1
2α
if j ∈ C10
0 if j ∈ C0 \ C01
1 if j ∈ C1 \ C10
is feasible (i.e., it lies in S and satisfies (33)) and achieves an objective value of d(x, s∗i )/(2ℓ) =(
2α−1
2α
)2
. Moreover, s∗i is defined for any strategy x ∈ Z and any equilibrium strategy ~e(i) ∈ Z
with d(x,~e(i)) = 2ℓ > 0 and always attains the same objective value d(x, s∗i )/(2ℓ) =
(
2α−1
2α
)2
.
To confirm that s∗i is indeed a minimizer of the above strictly convex minimization problem, we
observe that the KKT optimality conditions are satisfied at s∗i with KKT multipliers µ =
2α−1
2ℓα for (33)
and 0 for all the constraints of (31). To verify this claim, we let
f(y) =
1
2ℓ

∑
j∈C0
y(j)2 +
∑
j∈C1
(1− y(j))2

 and
g(y) =
∑
j∈C10
y(j) −
∑
j∈C01
y(j) − ℓ(1− α)/α
We first observe that complementary slackness constraints are satisfied, since g(s∗i ) = 0 and all other
KKT multipliers are 0. Primal and dual feasibility constraints are also satisfied. Regarding stationarity
constraints, we observe that ∇jf(s
∗
i ) = 0, for any j 6∈ C01 ∪ C10, ∇jf(s
∗
i ) =
2α−1
2ℓα , for all j ∈ C01,
and ∇jf(s
∗
i ) =
1−2α
2ℓα , for all j ∈ C10. Similarly, ∇jg(s
∗
i ) = 0 for any j 6∈ C01 ∪ C10, ∇jg(s
∗
i ) = −1,
for all j ∈ C01, and ∇jg(s
∗
i ) = 1, for all j ∈ C10. Therefore, stationarity constraints are also satisfied
with KKT multiplier µ = 2α−12ℓα .
We note that the proof of Theorem 6 shows something stronger, namely that for any equilibrium
strategy ~e(i) ∈ Z and any strategy x ∈ Z , with x 6= ~e(i), there is a preferred srtategy s∗i ∈ S, defined as
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in the proof of Theorem 6, such that d(x, s∗i )/d(x,~e(i)) =
(
2α−1
2α
)2
. Therefore, the proof of Theorem 6
shows that for any agent i, βi =
(
2α−1
2α
)2
.
Combined with Theorem 3, Theorem 6 implies that for opinion formation with binary preferences
(where we do not have local aggregation and Lemma 3 holds with τ = 1, as an immediate consequence
of the model defitinion in [FGV16]), the price of anarchy is at most δ(2α−1)−2, and at most (2α−1)−2
in the fully symmetric case where δ = 1. Combining this bound with the fact that the price of anarchy is
unbounded for all α ∈ [0, 1/2] [FGV16], we get the complete picture of the price of anarchy for opinion
formation with binary preferences, for all α ∈ [0, 1].
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